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THE EVOLUTION OF THE FIDEICOMISO (TRUST)
CONCEPT UNDER MEXICAN LAW
RODOLFO BATIZA

Maitland, in his Third Lecture. stated that to an Englishman the
trust seems to be one of the essentials of civilization. However, Maitland
was surprised to find that foreign legal systems succeeded in existing without
it. Take, for example, the Civil Code of Germany; where is the trust, Maitland would ask. It is just not there. This, in the eyes of an Englishman,
represents an enormous gap which, to a foreigner, is not even noticeable.
This is to be explained, Maitland suggests, by the fact that the trust does
not fit into other legal systems.'
This situation has changed considerably since the time Maitland referred
to it, almost half a century ago. The problem of the adaptation of the trust
into the civil law, i.e., those legal systems which trace their origins back
to the Roman law, has, nevertheless, given rise to two antagonistic positions.
Over a quarter of a century has elapsed since Esquivel Obreg6n asserted
that Mexico neither had, nor could have for a long time, anything that
would resemble the trust; and this because no legislative enactment could
create from one day to another the set of conditions, individual or social,
which had made the trust possible and highly beneficial in the English
speaking countries .2 The Panamanian writer Alfaro, on the contrary, contends that although the adaptation of the principles of the English trust
to the civil law has always seemed to some people to be something impracticable, or at least, surrounded by insurmountable difficulties, there is no
reason to believe one thing or the other for such adaptation has proved to
be simpler than might scem possible.

It is to be noted that Alfaro limits the problem to the legal adaptation
of the trust whereas Esquivel Obreg6n considered individual and social
factors to be of greater importance. Irrespective of whether or not a "correct" legal adaptation of the trust was made, or the extent to which individual and social conditions warranted such adaptation, the trust began
moving into the civil law system 4 shortly after the First World War.
1. MAITLAND: EQUITY, A COURSE OF LECTURES, p. 23 (1949).

2. Toribio Esquivel Obreg6n: "Cardcter de to que la Ley Bancaria llama FideicoREviSTA GENERAL DR DERECIIO Y JURISPRUDENCIA. M&ico 1930.
3. RICARDo J. ALFAROS "Adaptaci6n del trust del derecho anglosai6n al derecho

miso." Vol. 1,

civid."

ACADEMIA

INTERAMARICANA DE DERECIKO

COMPARADO

E INTERNACIONAL.

VOL.

1.

Havana, 1948. Professor F. F. Stone has stated: "The assimiliation
of the alien concept has been attended by less difficulty than many had feared, and much
itself as to the nature of the adopted institution." "Trusts in Louisiana." INCT'L & CoNIF.
L. Q. July, 1952.
4. Japan, in 1922, and Liechenstein, in 1926, enacted laws on the subject.
CURSOS MONOCRAFICOS.

EVOLUTION OF FIDEICOMISO
The trust found fertile ground in Latin America. Beginning with
Columbia in 1923, the civilian version of the trust, under the various names
of fideicomiso, comisiones or operaciones de confianza (trust-commissions
or operations, and mandato (agency) has been introduced in the legal
systems of the following countries: Panama (January, 1925), s Chile (September, 1925),6 Mexico (June, 1926),7 Bolivia (July, 1928, but in abeyance
until 1955),8 Peru (May, 1931),0 Costa Rica (November, 1936),to Venezuela
(January, 1940),11 Nicaragua (October, 1940),12 . Guatemala (December,
1946),la Ecuador (August, 1948), 14 and Honduras (February, 1950).",
'The discussion herein will be limited to the legal adaptation of the
trust in Mexico, the various applications of the institution in banking practice
having been discussed in a previous article.10
The term fideicomiso made its initial appearance in its new' meaning
as equivalent to the trust in the General Law of Credit Institutions and

5. Law No. 9 of January 6, 1925, as amended by Law No. 17 of February 20,
1941 (fideicomiso).
6. Decree-Law No. 559 of September 26, 1925, as amended by Law No. 4827 of
February 11, 1930 (comisiones de confianza).
7. General Law of Credit Institutions and Banking Establishments of December
24,-Law of Trust Banks of June 30, 1926, General Law of Credit Institutions and Banking Establishments of August 31, 1926, General Law of Credit Institutions of June 28,
1932. These statutes were successively superseded. The laws presently in force are: General Law of Instruments and Transactions of Credit of August 26, 1932, as amended
by a Decree published in the Diario Oficial of August 31, 1933, and by Decree of April
1i, 1945; General Law of Credit Institutions and Auxiliary Organizations of May 3,
1941, as amended by Decrees of February 11, 1946, August 21, 1942 and December 29,
1956 (D.O. of December 31) (fideicomiso).
8. General Law of Banks No. 608 of July 11, 1928, as amended by Supreme
Decree of August 20, 1928, Law of January 26, 1929, Regulatory Decree of October
24, 1929, Supreme Decree of June 30, 1942, Law of December 9, 1941, Law of July
18, 1944. Decree-Law of July 19, 1944, Supreme Decree No. 255 of January 30, 1945,
and Decree of May 10, 1955 (fideicomiso).
9. Law of Banks, being Decree-Law No. 7159 of May 23, 1931, as amended by
Laws No. 7484 of February 11, 1932, No. 8050 of March 23, 1935, No. 8778 of
October 27, 1938, No. 8973 of September 28, 1939 and by Supreme Decrees of November 15, 1940, and December 31, 1941 (these last two having been enacted by virtue
of Law No. 9187 of October 7, 1940) (comisiones de confianza).
10. General Law of Banks No. 15 of November 5, 1936, as amended by Laws, No.
38 of April 4, 1939, No. 24 of May 30, 1941 and No. 13 of October 2, 1943 (eomisiones
de eonfianza).
11. Law of Banks of January 24, 1940, as amended by Law of July 22, 1941, and
Law of August 25, 1943. These laws have been superseded by Law of Fideicomisos of
July 23. 1956 (fideicomiso). See comment in 5 ANi. I. Comp. L.628 (1956).
12. General Law of Banking Institutions of October 26, 1940, as amended by Law
No. 158 of August 4, 1941 (comisiones de confianza or fideicomiso).
13. Law of Banks No. 315 of December 5, 1946 (operaciones de con fianza).
14. Codification of the General Law of Banks of March 17, 1948 (mandato).
15. Law for Banking Establishments, being Decree No. 63 of February 10, 1950
(no specific designation).
16. See the writer's article: "Realidades del Fideicomiso en Mxico." Vol. III,
No. 4. REvIsTA BANcARIA. Mxico. July-August. 1955.
17. The old and traditional meaning of the term fideicorniso, going back to the
Roman law, referred to dispositions mortis causa, including in this last term both
testamentary (stricto sensu) and non-testamentary dispositions, whereby the deceased
transferred his estate or part thereof to his heir with instructions to transfer it to another
person.

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Banking Establishments of December 24, 1924. The so-callecd "trust banks"
(bancos de fideicomiso) were among the various banking institutions regulated by this law which, however, lacked a concept of fideicomiso. The
regulation of trust banks was dealt with by a subsecqucnt special law, the
Trust Banks Law of June 30, 1926.
Article 6 of the Trust Banks Law dcfined (ideicomiso in the following terms: "Fideicomiso, properly called, is an irrevocable agency by virtue
of which specific property is delivered to the Bank in its capacity as 'fiduciary' (fiduciario) in order that it may dispose thereof or of the income of
the same according to the will of the pcrson who dclivcrs the property,
called the 'settlor' (fideicoinitente) for the benefit of a third party called
the 'beneficiary' (fideieornisarioor beneficiario)."
The Trust Banks Law vas in force for only about four months. It
was superseded by the General Law of Credit Institutions and Banking
Establishments of August 31, 1926, which consolidated the text of the former, retaining unchanged the foregoing definition of fideicomiso.
The influence of the Alfaro Draft on Fideicomiso of 1920 upon the
aforementioned definition is evident.s A closer examination, however,
reveals that the definition departed from its model in two important points:
first, it suppressed the element consisting of the transfer of ownership from
the settlor to the fiduciary, substituting therefore a mcre "delivery"; and
second, it restricted the capacity to act as a fiduciary in favor of banks alone.
The General Law of Credit Institutions and Banking Establishments
of 1926 was in turn superseded by the General Law of Credit Institutions
of June 29, 1932. The Explanation of Purposes of the latter contained
the following statements: "The Law of 1926 introduccd in Mexico, brcaking with tradition, the juridical institution of fideicomiso . . . . Unfortunately,
however, the Law of 1926 failed to determine the substantive nature of
the institution and left, consequently, great vagueness in the concepts relating thereto. In order that the institution may live and prosper in our
environment a clear definition is required of its contents and of its effects,
this definition coming under the Gencral Law of Instruments and Transactions of Credit, and an adequate regulation is also rcquired of the institutions acting as fiduciaries. hc fideieomiso will be conceived as an estate
(patrimonio) destined to a purpose the achicvement of which is entrusted
to the activity of a fiduciary, thus defining clearly the nature and effects
of this institution which the law now in force obscurely conceives as an
irrevocable agency."
18. Article 1 of said Draft reads as follows: '"The fideieomiso is an irrevocable
agency by virtue of which specific property is transferred to a person called trustee
(fiduciario) to deal therewith in accordance with the instructions of the person who
transfers it, called settlor (fideicoinitente), for the benefit of a third party called beneficiary (fideicoinisaria)."
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The present General Law of Instruments and Transactions of Credit,
of August 26, 1932, while changing somewhat the wording of the explanation of purposes of the prior law, but not altering its basic idea, provided
in article 346: "By virtue of the fideicorniso the settlor destines certain
property to a specfic lawful purpose, entrusting the achievement of this
purpose to a fiduciary institution."
The influence of the interpretation given by the French writer Lepaulle

on the juridical nature of the trust is apparent both in the Explanation of
Purposes and in Article 346, except as regards the restriction in favor of
banks to act as fiduciaries, which has been a feature of Mexican law since
the year 1924.1"
rhe legal concept of the Mexican trust, both in the laws of 1926 and
in the law presently in force, is technically defective. It lacks the essential
element of the transfer of ownership of subject matter of the fideicomiso
to the fiduciary. In the case of the laws of 1926 it is clear that the Panamanian model was deliberately not followed; in the case of the law now in
force the unwillingness to recognize that the fiduciary acquires title is
demonstrated by the rejection of Lepaulle's opinion as to the elements of
trust

20

The position taken by the Mexican legislation on this point is obviously mistaken. The draftsmen were acquainted with the mechanism of
the Panamanian fideicomiso which was designed after the English trust.
Alfaro described this mechanism in the following words: "The commission entrusted to the fiduciary produces another effect without which it
could not be discharged: that of transferring to the fiduciary the property
subject matter of the fideicomiso . .. . It is, therefore, of the essence of the
fideicomiso and indispensable to its purposes that the settlor relinquish own-

19. "The trust is a destination (afectaei6n) of property guaranteed by the intervention of a person who is under the duty to do everything reasonably necessary to
fulfill said destination, and who has title to all the rights which are useful to perform
said duty." Pierre Lepaulle. "La Naturaleza del Trust." Vol. 1II, REvISTA GENERAL DR
DEarEcno v. JURISPRUOENCIA. Mxico, 1932, translated from the French by Pablo Macedo.
20. Said author, in effect, stated: "A proprietor, the settlor transfers, either wholly
or in part, specific property to a third party called trustee." 6p. cit. He also added,
however: "The thing placed in trust may be in the estate of no one." Op. cit. It is
interesting to note that the Mexican law embodied an idea which characterizes Lepaulle's
later development in his legal thinking. In his Trait, infra, he holds: "These rights
(those belonging to the settlor) are no longer in the estate of anyone. In effect, they
must not remain in the settlor s estate; if they do it would be a mere agency coupled
with a bailment. They must not he in the trustee's estate, otherwise, there would be
a donation of a conditional gift or a contract for the benefit of a third party, but there
would not be a trust, In effect, in a trust the property is never in the trustee's estate,
it does not go to his heirs, and does not constitute a pledge for his creditors. Lastly, the
res is not in the beneficiary's estate (otherwise the so-called trustee would be an agent,
a testamentary executor, a guardian, a subagent, etc. . . . but not a trustee). Each
cestui has in his estate only the beneficiary interest." TRAITE TiIEORIQUE ET PRACTIQUE
DES TRUSTs Em DROIT INTERNE, EN DROIT FISCAL ET EN DROi-r INTERNATIONAL, p, 26,
Paris 1932.

AIIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
ership of the property to which the fideicomiso refers, and that lie transfer
the same to the person in whom he deposits his confidence. ' ' 1
There is no doubt that a legal institution patterned along the lines of
the later concept propounded by Lepaulle cannot possibly work in prac-

tice without recognizing that the fiduciary has some powers to dispose of
the property, if only for the purpose of enabling him to perform his duties.
The amputation suffered by the trust, as conceived in the Mexican
legislation, has given rise to much misunderstanding in the courts and in
legal literature. Fortunately the Supreme Court, overruling its former position,2 2 has maintained in five decisions-'3 over the last eight years a viewpoint which supplements and corrects the vagueness and lack of precision
of the legislative concept of the fideicomiso.
In the amparo Mexicana de Fideicomisos,'-'4 the Third Chamber of the
Supreme Court stated: "Consequently, the complainant having acquired
the right to be the fiduciary owner of the property, and having possession
thereof before the date on which the foreclosure proceedings were commenced, summons had to be served on it notwithstanding the circumstance
invoked by the District Judge consisting in that the mortgage was constituted before the fideicomiso. This only means that the mortgage has preference as to payment, but it has nothing to do with the procedural right
to have a prior hearing and to be served with summons in the suit. This
is the right which the complainant basically claims so that it may not be
deprived of its vested rights in the property without first having its day
in court .

. .

. In the case at bar, since the change with respect to owner-

ship and possession occurred before suit was commenced it must be said
with even greater reason that, in order not to impair the right provided
for in Article 14 of the Constitution,25- it was necessary that the complain21. "El Fideicomiso. Estudio sobre ]a necesidad y conveniencia de introducir en
lalegislaei6n de los pusblos latinos una instituci6n nueva, semejante al trust del derecho
ingl6s." IMPRENTA NACIONAL, pp. 48, 49, Panama, 1920.
22. Where the Court stated that the property the subject matter of the fideicoruiso
is not transferred from the settlor to the fiduciary, and that the fiduciary has only the
functions of a mere manager. Amparo No. 210/1937, Cia. Limitada del Ferrocarril
Mexicano, LII Semanario Judicial de la Federaci6n (hereinafter S.J.F.) 2317, 2325.
(June 23, 1937).
23. In ampfaro jurisdiction, see infra note 2-1, five decisions make jurisprudencia,
binding law like a ease under stare decisis. See also infra note 31.
24. The "amrparo" is an institution peculiar to Mexican law dating back a century.
The amparo may be filed either as a suit starting with a complaint, or as an appeal.
It is used both as a defense against arbitrary actions or decisions of government officials
or agencies or against laws. The Federal Supreme Court is divided into four separate
Chambers following the main branches of the law: criminal, administrative, civil, and
labor. The Supreme Court may take cognizance of amparos either by original or appellate
jurisdiction. The decisions handed down in amparo proceedings protect the individual
against the violation of constitutional rights in the specific situation complained against,
without making a general declaration concerning unconstitutional acts, especially in the
case of unconstitutional laws. The legal bases of the amparo are found in Articles 103
and 107 of the Federal Constitution, and the regulations thereof are contained in the
Organic Law, as amended, of December 30, 1935.
25. No. 4298/1949, S..I17,, Vol. CIII, 1768, 1773, (1950).
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ant should have bcen summoned in the suit, inasmuch as to its status as
fiduciary owner of the realty, it also acquired possession thereof."

In Finarncierade Construcciones, S. A .2 6 the Court said: "The District
Judge failed to examine the fundamental question at issue and conse-

quently failed to decide with respect to the juridical nature of the contract of fideicomiso. The complainant maintains that the contract trans-

fers ownership and bars further encumbrances. Since the other rights invokcd in the amparo petition are dependent upon the result of this study,
such question is herein examined . . . and from the text of the aforementioned provisions (Articles 346, 349, 351, 352, 353, 356, and 358, General Law
of Instruments and Transactions of Credit) it is clear, and such is the doetrinC2 7 on the point, that the fideicomiso transfers ownership since by
virtue of the contract the settlor is deprived of all actions or rights of disposition with respect to the property which is its subject matter. Actions
and rights arc transferred to the fiduciary institution for the strict and
faithful accomplishment of the lawful purpose entrusted to it; that is, the
fiduciary is subrogated to exercise the full power of management and disposition which, before the contract, belonged to the owner of the property
now under fiducia. These powers are limited only by rights acquired before the creation of the fideicomiso. In these circumstances, once the

fideicomiso was created without any reservation and recorded in the Registry of Property, the contract produced its effects. Consequently the settlor,
unless the essence of the fideiceomiso is destroyed and the covenant
breached, is no longer able to exercise powers of management or rights of
free disposition over the property segregated, nor consequently, to create
new encumbrances in favor of third parties. The disregard of the rights
acquired by the fiduciary institution and of those which correspond to it
through the recording in the Registry of Property constitutes an infringement of constitutional rights."
The Fourth Chamber of the Supreme Court, in the amparo Sosa Garcia
Efrain,2s held that: ". . . from the moment in which this [the fideiomisoj is

created, an autonomous and sui generis estate is formed, designed for
specific purposes and the restricted ownership thereof is acquired by the
fiduciary. The property goes out of the settlor's estate to form this sui
generis estate. The property may or may not revert to the former owner,
as provided in articles 357 and 358 of the General Law of Instruments and
Transactions of Credit; this only implies the reacquisition of the proprietary rights relinquished by the settlor upon the creation of the fideicomiso
26. No. 4572/1948, S.J.F., Vol. CV, 2047, 2057, (1950).
27. The term doctrine means the systematic treatment of legal subjects developed
by scholars. The importance of doctrine in the civil law countries is demonstrated by the
fact that it is considered to be a secondary source of the law. Courts often resort to
doctrine when codes or statutes are silent or unclear on a given point.
28. No. 3308/1950, SJ., Vol. CVIII, 1328, 1339, (1951).
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. . . . When the attachment was levied by the Conciliation and Arbitration

Board, the fideicoiniso already existed and had been recorded in the respective public registry, then there is no doubt that property not belonging to
the defendant was attached, but property constituting the sui generis estate
mentioned above, the agent for the administration [the purposes of the
fideicorniso] of such property being the Banco Mexicano Espanol. This
institution was the only one entitled to exercise the pertinent rights for the
defense and care of the estate under its responsibility."

Several years later, in another opinion20 the Supreme Court, speaking
again of the fldeicomiso stated: ". . . as in the case of the agent who acts
in the interest and for the account of his principal, the fiduciary acts in the
interest of the beneficiary and for the account of the settlor. The fiduciary
also acts in the exercise of the powers which have been granted to it, almost
always in accordance with articles 352, 355, and 356 of the General Law
of Instruments and Transactions of Credit. It is because of that transfer
of specific rights in the property given in fideicomiso that the settlor cannot
modify or disregard what has been done by the fiduciary within the scope
of the powers transferred for the accomplishment of the purpose sought.
The adoption of the complainant's reasoning would lead to the perversion
of the very essence of the fideicomiso as it is established in the law and set
up in the fideicomiso deed because it would affect the fiduciary's freedom
of action and hinder or prevent the accomplishment of the essential purpose of the fideicomiso. This purpose consisted in the sale of lots [of land]
in order to pay the loan by the beneficiary and also subordinating that
freedom, not to the general instructions set forth in the fideicomiso but to
those instructions that [the fiduciary] should request from the settlor in
each specific transaction. [The settlor] might give or refuse to give the
instruction, thus impeding the fiduciary institution in the performance of
the obligations assumed by it and the accomplishment of what is deemed
indispensable in order to insure the amortization of the loan by the beneficiary in whose benefit and guarantee the fideicomiso was created. As
between the settlor and the fiduciary there is a relationship such as that
which exists between a person who conveys title to property and the person acquiring it, inasmuch as the former transmits to the latter the title
to the property given in fideicomiso. Once the fideicorniso is tenninated
the title to the same property is returned from the fiduciary to the settlor.
This is the reason why the institution of agency is not sufficient to explain
the fiduciary's legal capacity in the performance of the legal acts which
have been entrusted by the fideicomiso. In the discharge of the fideicomiso
the fiduciary does not act in the name of another, but exercises a right of
its own, inasmuch as the fiduciary has title to the property subject to the
29. Amparo "Acosta Sierra Francisco," No. 2064/1952, S.J.F., Vol. CXVIII, 1802,

1101, (1953).
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fideicomiso, without prejudice to its duty to account to the settlor and to
return the property which may remain upon termination of the fideicomiso
.... Inasmuch as the fideicomiso transfers title, the fiduciary's power of
disposition over the property given in fideicomiso may be limited only by
the respective instructions which may appear in the Public Registry of
Property."
In a case '10 involving a yarn mill where the property included machinery,
tools and a lease of the premises, the same Court said: "For the purposes
of the fideicomiso, title to the aforementioned property was transferred to
the fiduciary. The fiduciary institution could take possession of the factory
as soon as it deemed convenient . . . .According to the first and second
clauses of the instrument setting up [the fideicomiso], the fiduciary bank
acquired title to the factory, with everything pertaining thereto considered
as an industrial unit. As regards third parties the bank must be considered
as the sole owner, although in its relations with the settlor the bank is
bound by the purposes for which the fideicorniso was created. It is difficult to understand, otherwise, how [the fiduciary] could accomplish said
purposes when the beneficiary should make a demand upon it; that is, only
in its capacity as owner could it sell the property involved and make payment to the creditor without having to bring an action in order to enforce
the guarantee."
These opinions of the Supreme Court, although open to some objection in matters of detail, represent a sound effort toward creating better
understanding of the juridical nature of the fideicomiso and of the effects it
produces. Moreover, the Mexican variety of the stare decisis doctrine3 '
gives a significant weight to the position taken by the Supreme Court. In
view of the foregoing opinions it is no longer possible to confuse fideicdmiso
and agency.
For a number of years the need for a new legal regulation of the fideicomiso has been felt in Mexcio. The statute now in force might have been
satisfactory on a provisional basis twenty-five years ago when enacted. It
no longer responds to the needs created by the substantial development of
the fideicomiso' " In response to this felt need the Bankers Association of
Mexico prepared a draft of amendments to Chaper V, Title II, of the Gen30. Amparo "Fabrica de la Constancia" No. 6160/1954 (not yet published in
the S.J.F.).
31. According to Art. 193 of the Organic Law of Articles 103 and 107 of the
Federal Constitution, known as the Law of Amparo, five consecutive decisions handed
down by any Chamber of the Supreme Court constitute "jurisprudence."

Jurisprudence

interpreting the Constitution, federal laws, or international treaties, is law for the
Chambers themselves, for the circuit courts, district judges, courts of the different states,
and the labor boards.
32. In the year 1939 fideicomisos in Mexico represented $25,943,000 (Mex. Cy.);
in the year 1944, the amount was $109,295,000; in the year 1949, it increased to $368,744,000; in the year 1954, the sum of $658,485,000. See the writer's article mentioned in
note 15, supra.
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eral Law of Instruments and Transactions of Credit which establishes the
fideicomiso.3' Article 346, as proposed to be amended in this draft, contains
a new definition which reads as follows: "In the fldeicomiso the fiduciary
institution acquires title to a right transferred by the scttlor, and it is
under the duty to exercise this right for the carrying out of a purpose or
in the interest of the beneficiary." With only slight modification of language article 808 of the draft of a new Code of Commerce, being prepared
by a governmental commission, has accepted the foregoing definition.
This new definition of fideicomiso is a substantial improvement on the
legal concept of the institution as presently in force. It is not, however,
completely free from criticism." This is not the occasion to attempt such
criticism, since the present article is limited to the discussion of Mexican
law, past and present.

33. It must be borne in mind that fiduciary operations are regulated also in the
General Law of Credit Institutions and Auxiliary Organizations.
34. Briefly, the definition uses the term titularidad which in the opinion of some
writers means "ownership" whereas in the opinion of others it has a broader meaning
so as to include rights other than proprietary rights.

